The Empire State
Extended periods of general peace are historical anomalies; the most powerful justification for the autocratic Roman empire was that it provided the peoples of the Mediterranean basin with two centuries of nearly universal concord, temporarily securing them from the formidable arms of the barbarians, and the equally dangerous terrors of anarchy. In a thousand years, historians may well pass a similar judgment on the United States. Despite its irritating assertions of moral superiority, and sometimes dangerous foreign adventurism, it has been the most powerful state in the world during a period which has not witnessed a single major military conflict between the great powers since the Korean War.
In Europe, that result has been primarily due to its decision to integrate the myriad states of the continent economically and politically, by encouraging the growth of free trade and democracy, as well as by its constant commitment to maintaining a formidable military capable of deterring even a superpower like the Soviet Union from attacking its principal allies. In Asia, no major bloodletting has erupted since the mid 1970s thanks to the United States' active efforts, through a policy of containment, to prevent Chinese or North Korean expansion, and its equally important measures to integrate China into the world economy by encouraging the growth of capitalism in the world's only significant communist state.
Certainly, there is a great deal of blood still being shed across the planet; but these conflicts are not new, and America can hardly be blamed for the fact that their destructiveness has dramatically increased since the introduction of modern weapons. At bottom, the United States has succeeded in creating a state of nearly universal concord over a vast portion of the Earth's land mass; undoubtedly, there are states and individuals who, to different extents, oppose this new order. Although the views of terrorists like Bin Laden may be summarily dismissed, the hostility of democratic states like France and Germany must be carefully considered, for the policies of those states reflect the opinions of large numbers of free individuals.
The best indication of dissent toward America's international system is the current European attempt to form an independent army. Such an army, based around the economic union, would reduce their dependency on the United States' military for peacekeeping and other operations. This is a grand political ideal, but so far it has not been adequately funded. Indeed, Tomas Valasek, the Brussels director of the Centre for Defense Information, argues that the attempt to build a European army is largely symbolic: "The push toward an EU military identity has, in spite of high expectations, failed to generate significant new capabilities. The project is more a search for a unique identity separate from the US and NATO than a response to any real threats. It is telling, then, that three of the staunchest advocates of autonomous European defence - Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg - figure last among the 19 NATO allies in military spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product."
Such a desire is understandable: for hundreds of years the great powers of Europe controlled international affairs, and the only way that they will be able to reclaim an outstanding position in the global arena is by creating a common foreign policy for the entire European Union. Moreover, it is a not a surprising development. All empires (and America's international system is essentially based on a very enlightened form of imperialism) must contend with discontented groups who want to assert their independence. The essential requirements for such an assertion are economic and military independence.
In 1864 Otto Von Bismarck declared that "the great issues of the day will not be resolved by speeches and the resolutions of majorities - that was the great mistake from 1848 to 1849 - but by iron and blood."
The logic of the great German statesman, however distasteful, has not changed since the mid 19th century. The United States' preeminent position among the nations of the world is based on these twin pillars: it uses its economic power to bind its international system together, while simultaneously protecting that system from outsider states like North Korea and Iraq with its overwhelming military might.
If Europe wants to mount a significant challenge to American supremacy, it will have to construct a first-class military, while simultaneously developing an economic policy which is not dependent on Washington and New York. In all probability, such a challenge will never be mounted because of the tremendous costs which it would inevitably entail. If the debate over Iraq is any indication, even if the resources were available, it is unlikely that the member states of the European Union would ever unanimously agree to pursue such an objective.
France and Germany vehemently opposed Bush's decision to topple Saddam's Hussein's regime in Iraq, while Britain was, and remains, the president's staunchest foreign ally. This dichotomy does not bode well for European unity, because it indicates a fundamentally divergent view of American foreign policy in general. For Chirac and Schröder, the most dangerous aspect of the War on Terrorism is that it has the potential to legitimize American power. If in twenty years there are viable democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, even the most profound cynic will be unable to dispute that the United States is not interested in conquering other states for its own selfish interests.
Instead he will have to grant that Washington has struck down two atrocious tyrannies and replaced them with liberal states, and perhaps go so far as to grant that other states, interested in promoting the same values, should co-operate with its leaders. Such an outcome is probable, if only because the disastrous consequences for the US of withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan will likely deter even Howard Dean from embarking on such a course. This presents a nightmare for the leaders of France and Germany (it is very difficult to effectively berate a saint) and strengthens their opposition to the invasion of Iraq. In contrast, Blair has embraced Bush as an ally, and worked hard to maintain the special relationship between their two states, not only because there is a tradition of good relations between the transatlantic partners, but because it is likely that, like Chirac and Schröder, he appreciates what the probable outcome of Bush's foreign ventures will be.
The leaders of France and Germany are at the head of those European states which dream about setting up an alternative to American power; Britain heads the faction which believes that cooperation with Washington is the wiser policy. This discord means that attempts to form a truly European foreign policy are doomed to failure, and that the lifespan of America's enlightened empire may rival that of Rome's.
29th Jan 2004