A Headache for the West
North Korea - or the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, as it likes to be known - is a headache for the West in just about every respect. A state which has technically been at war with its southern neighbour since 1950, although a "temporary" armistice has been in place since 1953, it is by far the most reclusive, secretive nation on earth - a secrecy that serves to mask countless human rights abuses, a Stalinist economy in ruin and, it seems, an advanced nuclear weapons programme. On Thursday last week, the South Korean ambassador to the UK, Tae-Sik Lee, came to Oxford to discuss this latter issue in particular with the university's Korean Society, granting an exclusive interview to The OxStu shortly afterwards.
Ambassador Lee is a quietly spoken, measured and extremely authoritative man, whose slow, thoughtful delivery style conjures up an atmosphere almost of deference amongst those attending his talk. Evidently highly intelligent (with a degree in International Relations and a sound grasp of nuclear physics to his name), he performs the rather astonishing feat of delivering a 50-minute speech on the background to the current nuclear stand-off with Pyongyang, both in a foreign tongue and without the aid of a single scrap of paper. Given the often highly technical nature of the subject matter, one could scarcely fail to be impressed.
"My experience and knowledge in this area are limited," he began in almost laughably modest style. The talk focussed very much upon the facts, and in particular the series of events from 1993, when North Korea first threatened to withdraw from the international non-proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons, to the present-day crisis. North Korea has been at loggerheads with the international community ever since its announcement in January 2003 that it was fully withdrawing from the non-proliferation treaty and restarting its nuclear programme. Mr Lee highlighted as alarming the recent American intelligence assessment that Kim Jong-il's secretive regime probably has eight or nine plutonium-based nuclear weapons at its disposal, as opposed to the one or two previously feared present. He forwarded the stark view that it could only be a matter of time before up to thirty such weapons are being manufactured each year.
All is clearly not rosy, then - but there were hints of optimism in the ambassador's message. It is, of course, the Bush regime that is foremost amongst Pyongyang's critics, having taken a highly confrontational stance towards this member of the so-called Axis of Evil since first coming to power in January 2001; but Mr Lee said that an agreement was nearly reached during the last set of "six-party talks" between the powers involved in the present impasse, hosted by China last February.
Then the only sticking point was Washington's refusal to grant the explicit non-aggression assurances demanded by North Korea in exchange for any dismantling of its nuclear programme, and the ambassador expressed hope - if not, it must be said, confidence - that this major difference could be resolved at the next round of talks, due in June.
Yet there were hints of frustration - naturally, never explicit - at the USA's confrontational stance throughout the process. After all, South Korea had been quietly pursuing a highly successful "sunshine" policy of constructive engagement with the North prior to George W Bush's election, which has been severely undermined by the "bull-in-china-shop" approach of the current White House. A wistful reference to Bill Clinton's narrow failure to strike a permanent deal with Pyongyang, during the dying days of his presidency, certainly seemed to reveal much.
Catching up with Ambassador Lee after the talk, The OxStu asked him just how worried he thought we should be about the North Korean nuclear threat. "We put the highest priority on the weapons issue," came the response. "People can use theoretical arguments that the threat is not real or potential, that it is just intended for deterrence reasons; but a bomb is a bomb, and a nuclear bomb is a nuclear bomb.
"Whatever North Korea intends to do with it, it poses serious dangers to its neighbours. Is there anybody who could accept one's neighbour becoming a nuclear power with equanimity?" It is difficult to argue with this. Whilst it would undoubtedly constitute political suicide for Kim Jong-il to launch an unprovoked nuclear strike on the South, the "Dear Leader" is not known for his rationality, and the presence of an atomic bomb at his disposal can hardly aid sleep patterns in Seoul.
Moving on to the eventual reunification of Korea - long aspired to by citizens of the peninsular - does Mr Lee see this as a feasible possibility? "In the very long run, it is the only possibility. The question is how long it will take."
Certainly this will sound promising to all Koreans who still hope one day to be able to travel freely between Seoul and Pyongyang - after all, a commitment to reunification on the part of South Korea can only serve to enhance the urgency with which it seeks to engage with the North. Actual success on this front may be a long way away, as the ambassador notes, but to surrender the unitary ideal (and thus, doubtless, scale back contact with Pyongyang) would only be likely to extend North Korea's voluntary period of international isolationism, and the consequent misery and poverty of its citizens.
Indeed, it is to the human rights issue - arguably the most troubling aspect of Kim Jong-il's regime - that the discussion now turns. The recent Ryongchon railway station disaster, which killed in excess of 150 Koreans near the Chinese border on 22nd April, turned the world's attention to the tremendous disregard that the regime appears to have for its own citizens' welfare. This seems particularly the case given that the disaster would almost certainly have been entirely covered up by Pyongyang had it not actually been visible from within Chinese territory. Does the ambassador believe there is any way of knowing what sorts of "invisible" abuses are taking place deep within North Korean territory?
"Well, we hear a lot of reports, but the administration never admits to anything. There are some serious problems, for sure - the question is how to improve matters. Our approach is a cautious, gradual one, under which we try to provide the regime with material assistance which will benefit the country as a whole. With luck, this will encourage the leadership to change its mind and its ways. However, if we try to use too much pressure, there is a danger of this backfiring in the short-term. We must act with great care."
All of which is in refreshingly stark contrast to the childishly bellicose language frequently employed by members of the US administration when questioned on the North Korean issue. Whilst the problem is undoubtedly a vast and complex one, Ambassador Lee gives the impression of a man who stoically believes a permanent, peaceful resolution to it can be found. If his is a mindset in any way representative of that of his government, the world has reason to be quietly optimistic.
Tae-Sik Lee was in Oxford as a guest of the Oxford University Korean Society. See users.ox.ac.uk/~koreasoc/
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6th May 2004